This paper presents preference axiomatizations of expected utility for nonsimple lotteries while avoiding continuity constraints. We use results by Fishburn (1975 ), Wakker (1993 , and Kopylov (2010) to generalize results by Delbaen et al. (2011) . We explain the logical relations between these contributions for risk versus uncertainty, and for finite versus countable additivity, indicating what are the most general axiomatizations of expected utility existing today.
Introduction
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) provided a well-known preference axiomatization of expected utility (EU) for simple lotteries. Delbaen et al. (2011, DDK hereafter) extended it to nonsimple lotteries while avoiding continuity constraints for utility. We present a simplified proof of their results using the more general Theorem 3 of Fishburn (1975) . Generalizations by Wakker (1993) to finitely additive lotteries and by Kopylov (2010) to uncertainty are also discussed. Because of these two generalizations, we also cover the domains of de Finetti (1937) and Savage (1954) . We show how to apply the uncertainty models of the latter three authors to risk, providing further generalizations there. Our analysis shows the relations between different EU derivations in the literature. In particular, we generalize DDK's result to general (possibly nonreal) outcomes and to more general lottery domains. The latter may (but need not) contain finitely additive rather than countably additive lotteries, and need not be convex.
We assume a preference relation on a convex set M of lotteries (measurable probability distributions over an arbitrary outcome set S, with all degenerate lotteries δ x included). Then weak ordering, an independence condition, and an Archimedean condition are necessary and sufficient for the existence of an affine functional U that represents . Defining u(x) = U(δ x ), the affine functional is * Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 0 10 408 12 65.
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uniquely determined as the EU of u on the linear space spanned by the degenerate lotteries, i.e., on the set of simple (finite-support) lotteries. Nonsimple lotteries are linearly independent of the degenerate lotteries, and here the affine functional can in principle be chosen freely. It can differ from EU as examples can show.
The extensions of EU to nonsimple lotteries provided in the literature often assumed S to be a subinterval of the reals. Then monotonicity or continuity-in-probability usually is enough to ensure EU for bounded lotteries, because these can be sandwiched between simple lotteries. As pointed out by DDK (p. 401), several authors used a continuity condition known as weak continuity, which in fact is restrictive, implying continuity-in-probability and continuity of utility u.
DDK argued for relaxing the aforementioned continuity constraints because they considered them not to be normative (DDK, p. 401). Another argument against continuity is that its observability status is problematic in the presence of other preference conditions (Krantz et al., 1971, Section 9.1; Pfanzagl, 1968, Section 6.6; Schmeidler, 1971; Suppes, 1974, Section 2) . Thus continuity is not as innocuous and ''merely technical'' as has sometimes been suggested (Arrow, 1971, p. 48; Drèze, 1987, p. 125 This note focuses on DDK's derivations of EU. DDK also provided continuity results with respect to some metric topologies, to which we have nothing to add. We do not discuss these results further. For brevity, we follow DDK in assuming an affine functional U 1 throughout and omitting the aforementioned necessary and sufficient preference conditions for the existence of U. For the preference conditions that we introduce later to be directly observable, they should not use U or u as input, and none of the preference conditions in this paper will do so.
Deriving the results of DKK from Fishburn's (1975) Theorem 3
Fishburn's (1975) Sections 1-4 consider a general setup where the preference domain M is allowed to contain finitely additive lotteries. We reproduce Theorem 3 from Fishburn's Section 5. As did DDK, this theorem focuses on countably additive lotteries and does not allow finitely additive lotteries in the preference domain. In Fishburn's analysis, the outcome set S is allowed to be general. Denote by µ ∧x the conditional distribution of µ over outcomes weakly less preferred than x, i.e., over u
, whenever the latter set is µ nonnull. Similarly, by µ ∨x we denote the conditional distribution of µ over outcomes weakly preferred to x, i.e., over u [u(x), +∞), again for outcomes x where the latter set is µ nonnull. When using this notation we implicitly assume that the distributions are well defined, i.e., the conditioning events are nonnull. A preference interval contains, for every pair of elements x, z, all outcomes y with x y z. That is, a preference interval is the u inverse of an interval. Fishburn made the following assumptions about the preference domain. Fishburn, 1975; A0.2: Fishburn, 1982, Section 3.3) .
Axiom 1 (0:
[Structural Assumption] M is a set of countably additive lotteries over a general set S, measurable with respect to an algebra on S that contains all singletons and every preference interval. M contains all degenerate lotteries and is convex. There exists an affine functional U on M that represents a preference relation on M. M is conditionally closed, i.e., if f ∈ M then the lottery conditional on a nonnull preference interval A ⊂ S, denoted f A , is also in M.
Fishburn used the following two conditions. The first one is stochastic dominance imposed only if at least one lottery involved is degenerate. Fishburn, 1975 ; A4 * : Fishburn, 1982, Section 3.4) . If µ ∈ M, A ⊆ S, µ(A) = 1, and y ∈ S, then µ
The second condition restricts the set of unbounded lotteries and is the main one to imply that all lotteries have a finite EU, equal to their U value. Fishburn, 1975 ; A5 * : Fishburn, 1982, Section 3.4) . If µ, ν ∈ M, ν is simple, and µ ≻ ν then µ ∧x ν for some x ∈ S. If µ, ν ∈ M, ν is simple, and µ ≺ ν then µ ∨y ν for some y ∈ S.
We now reproduce Fishburn's EU derivation. Fishburn, 1975; 3.4: Fishburn, 1982 Fishburn (1975) .
Theorem 1 (3:

Related work
Wakker (1993, Theorem 3.6) provided a generalization of Fishburn's (1975 Fishburn's ( , 1982 ) EU representations. As in DDK, he did not require continuity of utility. And as in Fishburn's Sections 1-4, Wakker considered cases where M is allowed (but not required) to contain finitely additive probability measures. Wakker also considered general outcome sets. Instead of stochastic dominance (properly extended to general outcomes), he used a conditional monotonicity condition (a counterpart of Savage's P7) which, under the other assumptions, is equivalent to stochastic dominance under countable additivity, but is stronger under finite additivity. Wakker's Example 4.10 showed that stochastic dominance is too weak under finite additivity. His domain assumptions and truncation condition were more general than those of Fishburn (1975 Fishburn ( , 1982 . They only require the availability of all simple functions, the existence of an equivalent simple lottery for each lottery, and the existence of truncations. This domain need not be convex. Then necessary and sufficient results were given. Kopylov (2010) provided a counterpart to the aforementioned works for Savage's (1954) EU representation. Kopylov and Savage did not consider decision under risk with lotteries, but decision under uncertainty, with a state space T and acts mapping states to outcomes. However, decision under risk can be considered to be a special case of decision under uncertainty (Kothiyal et al., 2011, Appendix C) . To see this point in the present context, assume the DDK model, with an interval outcome set. Define T = [0, 1] as state space with the usual Borel sigma algebra. We endow T with the uniform probability distribution. Preferences between acts are determined by preferences in the DDK model between the lotteries that the acts generate over the outcomes. In this way, DDK's models become models of Kopylov. Then all the conditions in Kopylov's Theorem 1 are satisfied in the results of DDK, and DDK's expected utility follows from the expected utility that Kopylov's result gives. In this way, Kopylov's theorem is also more general.
Kopylov (2010) also contains remarkable results for intertemporal choice. His Corollary 4 provides the first axiomatization in the literature of constant discounting in integral form. It is remarkable that this form, one of the most widely used evaluation formulas in the literature, had not received a preference axiomatization before. Axiomatizations of constant discounting had as yet been provided exclusively for discrete summations rather than continuous integrations over time (Koopmans, 1972; Bleichrodt et al., 2008) .
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We thank Samuel Drapeau and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. follow. Take a sequence of outcomes a j ∈ A strictly increasing to α. λ j := µ(a j , ∞) > 0 tends to 0 by countable additivity. For j large enough, λ j < 1. We assume this for all j (take a subsequence and reindex). Now µ ∧a j is well defined. Decompose
. Both conditional distributions are well defined because 0 < λ j < 1, and are contained in the preference domain (finite ψ expectation as with µ). 
for all j ≥ J. We may assume that J = 1 (take a subsequence and reindex). By countable additivity,  (a j ,∞) ψdµ tends to 0. By taking an increasing subsequence and reindexing, we can get 
Part 2 (Proof of Axiom 2)
. Axiom 2 trivially follows by restricting stochastic dominance to the case where one of the two lotteries involved is degenerate if stochastic dominance is strict, or if stochastic dominance is related to the preference order over outcomes rather than to the natural order on R. For the weak stochastic dominance with respect to the natural order on R used by DKK, the derivation is nontrivial, as can be inferred from their Example 2.1. 2 Assume, for contradiction, µ ≻ x but y x for every y in the support A of µ. (The case of µ ≺ x but y x is similar.) Take α, α j , and λ j as in Part 1. Again α ̸ ∈ A (otherwise α µ ≻ x α gives a contradiction). Again we have 0 < λ j < 1, and we get Eq. (1). By stochastic dominance, U(µ 
